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COMMENTARY ON CHAPTER 7: 
The "What" and "How" of Development: Really Two 
Separate Research Agendas? 
WOLFGANG SCHNEIDER 
As already pointed out by Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett (this volume), 
the participants in the Beroried meetiogs bad different and often con-
flicting opinions about many issues concerniog human development. 
Among these issues, the distioction between developmental processes 
and developmental mechanisms aod its implications for developmen-
tal research attracted special interest, leading to both stimulating and 
controversial discussions. lf my recollections of those debates are 
correct, the majority of participants took the position that the distinc-
tion between process aod mechanism has important implications, a 
view elaborated by Lightfoot aod Folds-Bennett (Chapter 7). A stable 
minority, however, including myself, saw the distinction as present-
ing a conceptually complicated and confusing problem. In particul.ar, 
these participants felt uncomfortable with the term mechanism, a 
word that is derived from the notion of mechanics and that suggests a 
decontextualized model of the human mind analogous to a machine 
with moving elements (see also Sigel, 1986). These participants ar-
gued that comparably neutral terms like developmental transitions or 
sources of developmental changes seem better suited to address the 
issue of explanation. 
Admittedly, the controversy concerning terminology-although in-
teresting from a theoretical point of view-addresses only a minor 
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problern when compared to the issue of jodging the importance of the 
distinction between {descriptive) processes and (explanatory) mecha-
nisms for developmental research and theory. This is the topic Light-
foot and Folds-Bennett have chosen for their interesting and 
provoking essay. When reading through the cbapter, I was immedi-
ately reminded of tbe discussions in Bernried: Similar to the debates 
at the monastery, the ideas expressed in the chapter very much stimu-
lated my thinking about issues of cognitive development. However, 
they also generated some confusion on my part. Given the amount of 
stimulation/provocation provided by this chapter, I thougbt it helpful 
to comment on its major points. 
Before discussing the issues in detail, I will first outline wbat I see 
as the most important assumptions treated in Chapter 7. These can be 
summarized as follows: (1) Like many leading developmental theo-
rists, the authors assume that the question of explanation is more im-
portant than the question of description. Accordingly, future research 
should give more emphasis to the issue of developmental mecha-
nisms. (2) Traditional developmental methodology based on ANOV A 
models cannot achieve this goal: Because the available methods focus 
on the analysis of group means, they may Iead to incorrect inferences 
conceming developmental changes in individuals. Instead of using 
"interindividual" methods, future research should focus on methods 
of "intraindividual" or "genetic" analysis. (3) Today's research can 
profit from looking at the past: For example, Lewin's experiments 
based on bis field-theoretical approach and Vygotsky's studies on 
concept formation (strongly influenced by Piaget's "clinical method") 
seem well-suited to give deep insights into the "lawfulness" of 
children's development. (4) Conclusion: Issues of developmental pro-
cesses and developmental mechanisms require different methodolo-
gies; they should be kept distinct. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will elaborate on these four 
major points. 
Should Our Research Focus More on the "Mechanisms" Issue? 
At first glance, the answer to this question seems clear. There is lit-
tle doubt that explaining development is more important than simply 
describing it. Like Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett, I fully agree with 
Flavell's (1984) contention that the question of explanation should be 
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"the ultimate objective of any science" (p. 188). Unlike Lightfoot and 
Folds-Bennett, however, I am not convinced that the state-of-the-art 
of developmental theory requires a particular emphasis on mecha-
nisms, at least not of the sort described in recent models of cognitive 
development. 
Why this negative attitude? In my view, a careful reading of the 
volume edited by Sternberg (1984), devoted to the exploration of 
mechanisms of cognitive development, elicits some skepticism con-
cerning tbe fruitfulness of this enterprise. First of all, it is surprising 
to see that there is little overlap among the six models of cognitive 
development presented in this volume (cf. Sigel, 1986). As Flavell 
(1984) put it: "Whenever one sees six different theories supposedly 
trying to explain the same thing, one sbould suspect that Trutb is not 
yet at band!" (p. 190). 
A second problern is tbat most theoretical approaches operate at a 
high Ievel of abstraction, making a large number of "bold and imagi-
native claims" (Flavell, 1984) about various aspects of cognitive de-
velopment. In principle, there is nothing wrong with trying to capture 
the "big picture" of human development, a goal that most of these 
theories try to reach. Given the high Ievel of abstraction, however, it is 
difficult to see how the theories could be falsified by experimental test. 
Third, and most importaßt in the present context, the basic concept 
of developmental mecbanism is never directly addressed in the vari-
ous theoretical approacbes (cf. Sigel, 1986). Tbe large collecion of 
"mechanisms" includes transformation rules, differentiation, coordi-
nation, hierarchical integration, discrimination, encoding processes, 
equilibration, and adaptation. Do these terms indeed denote explana-
tory concepts? Let us take Piaget's concept of equilibration as an ex-
ample. Aebli, one of Piaget's most prominent European students, has 
serious doubts in this regard (see Aebli, 1984). In bis view, Piaget's 
(unproven) core assumption is that children typically strive for con-
sistency in their thinking. Whenever children experience a state of 
imbalance, they try to overcome it, a process called "equilibration." 
According to Aebli, the term equilibration does not provide an expla-
nation for developmental change. While it indicates that consistency 
was reestablished, it does not tell us how this might bappen. 
Unfortunately, this is true for most concepts considered as mecha-
nisms in developmental theory. As emphasized by Sigel (1986) , the 
mecbanisms do not inforrn us about what governs developmental 
cbange. For example, to wbat extent is cbange controlled by 
232 Stability and Change in Development 
children's social interactions? Or what is the impact of biologi-
caVmaturational components? We need to know much more about the 
various sources of developmental change and their interrelations at 
different age Ievels. 
Does this mean that we should intensify our search for more salient 
developmental mechanisms, as Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett suggest? 
Although this must be an important goal in the long run, I do not 
think that current research should focus solely on issues of explana-
tion. In my view, problems of generalizability inherent in many con-
temporary models of cognitive development stem from the fact that 
the available data base is still weak. Despite the large number of em-
pirical studies on numerous issues in cognitive development, the 
number of robust, cross-validated findings is comparably restricted 
(see van der Veer, van IJzendoom, & Valsiner, in press, for a discus-
sion of the problern of replicability). Thus more emphasis should be 
given to a careful description of developmental changes over the life 
span. I do hope that an emphasis on systematic data collection will 
eventually enable us to come up with low-level inferences about 
mechanisms of developmental changes that are better founded than 
many of the higb-level "explanations" offered in contemporary devel-
opmental theory. But do we really need a different methodology to ac-
complish this goal? This is what I want to discuss in the next section. 
How Bad Is Our Developmental Methodology? 
As briefly mentioned above, Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett believe 
that current problems of the state-of-the-art of developmental theory 
are closely linked to the use of ANOV A models in data analysis. Be-
cause ANOV A models focus on group means, they are of limited util-
ity in understanding the development of individuals. 
I agree with the authors that a focus on ANOV A models restricts 
our knowledge about individual differences and their changes over 
time. Along with Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett, I also believe that 
ANOV A models still dominate developmental research. In my view, 
however, a more serious shortcoming of traditional developmental 
methodology is that it has been dominated by cross-sectional analy-
ses, comparing different age groups at one point in time. While many 
have voted for longitudinal designs, only a few have actually used 
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them. When Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett raised the issue that we 
need "intraindividual methods," I first thought they were referring to 
longitudinal methodology. A more careful reading of the chapter, 
however, revealed that I was wrong in this regard. The authors distin-
guish between two conceptual models of developmental analysis-the 
analysis of developmental functions and the analysis of individual 
differences-dairning that both approaches employ longitudinal de-
signs that are essentially interindividual. 
Franldy, I have problems with this claim. I still believe that one of 
the major advantages of longitudinal methods over cross-sectional de-
signs is that they allow for intraindividual analyses in addition to in-
terindividual comparisons. In particular, recent developments in 
growth curve modeling such as the Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
(HLM) procedure developed by Bryk and Raudenbush (1987; seealso 
Chapter 4) represent a nice example for the progress we have made in 
this regard: HLM not only gives an estimate of (intraindividual) 
growth curve parameters but also provides a statistical procedure that 
tries to "explain" the variation found among intraindividual growth 
curves. Despile the various conceptual and methodological problems 
of longitudinal studies (for overviews see Rogosa, 1988; Schneider, 
1989), there is no doubt that we have made considerable progress re-
garding the design and analysis of developmental studies over the last 
few years. As a matter of fact, we have overcome many of the disad-
vantages linked to the (cross-sectional) ANOV A methodologies al-
luded to by Lightfoot and Folds-Beonett. 
What Can We Really Learn From the Past? 
As you may weH imagine, I was curious to leam more about the 
type of "iotraiodividual analysis" that Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett 
conceive of as "the king's road" for the explanation of developmeotal 
change. In order to clarify their position, the authors refer to the theo-
retical framework elaborated by Lewin and by Vygotsky, focusing on 
an experimental method called "genetic analysis." Because this term 
has several connotations in the literature, I discuss the major charac-
teristics of the experimental approaches used by Lewin and Vygotsky 
before judging their importance for the explanation of developmental 
changes. 
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LEWIN'S VERSION OF "GENETIC ANALYSIS" 
Lewin's "detour problem" is presented as an illustrative example 
for genetic analysis within the field theory paradigm. In this task, a 
child must navigate around two different types of barriers in order to 
reach a piece of chocolate (see Figure 7 .2). As Lightfoot and Folds-
Bennett point out, young children typically have more problems with 
the type of barrier that requires initial movement in a direction op-
posed to the location of the chocolate. In Lewin's terminology, this 
means a movement away from the "positive valence" associated with 
the piece of chocolate: Solution to this problern requires a "psycho-
logical restructuring" of the problern situation in that the first move-
ment, although away from the "valence," becomes the fust of several 
steps toward the chocolate. According to Lewin, successful perfor-
mance in this task depends on the child 's age ( older children perform 
better than younger ones), on the strength of a valence (the stronger 
the valence, the more difficult the task), aod on the ability to restruc-
ture the task as a set of related movements rather thao a series of sep-
arate movements. 
Undoubtedly, this is an interesting experimental task. lt is difficult, 
however, to see how this "genetic analysis" differs from moremodern 
approaches used in experimental methodology. One possible differ-
ence may be that Lewin operated with theoretical concepts like fleld 
force, valence, or psychological restructuring that he took for granted, 
whereas modern experimenters probably would like to make these con-
cepts more accessible and testable in their experimental desigos. 
For example, Lewin's clairn that performaoce in the detour problern 
task varies as a function of the strength of valence could be easily 
tested by varying the degree of attractiveness of the target. Lewin's 
theory would be confirmed if even older children fail to solve the 
more difficult barrier problern when the target is very attractive to 
them. It would be falsified, however, if we fouod a positive correla-
tion between degree of target attractiveness and successful task solu-
tions, regardless of age (i.e., the more attractive the target, the higher 
the percentage of successful solutions). 
In my view, Lewin's experimental procedure canoot be conceived 
of as qualitatively different frorn modern experimental methodolo-
gies. The major difference concems terminology: Modem problern 
solving theories would probably avoid Lewin's rather abstract expla-
nations of successful task performance like "an understanding of the 
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difference between physical and psychological realities" or "a suc-
cessful construction of the life space" in favor of more concrete, Ob-
servable behaviors. Thus it is really difficult for me to see how 
Lewin's approacb of genetic analysis can Iead to the detection of gen-
eral "developmental mecbanisms." The explanatory value of a term 
such as psychological restructuring seems similarly restricted as the 
Piagetian concept of equilibration. 
VYGOTSKY'S VERSION OF "GENETIC ANALYSIS" 
Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett use Vygotsky's studies of concept for-
mation based on bis "method of double stimulation" as an example 
for bis version of genetic analysis. This method involved presenting 
subjects (i.e., children, adolescents, and adults) with two sets of stim-
uli. For example, children were given a number of wooden blocks that 
could be sorted according to featuressuch as color, shape, height, and 
size. The underside of each block, not seen by the subjects, contained 
one of four nonsense words. Children were asked to select all blocks 
that might be of the same kind. Whenever a block was "wrongly cho-
sen," the experimenter tumed over the block, indicated that it bad a 
different word on it, and asked the child to continue sorting. The ex-
periment consisted of a sequence of child sorts and experimenter cor-
rections, until the child correctly sorted the blocks as indicated by the 
nonsense words. As a main result, Vygotsky found that the ability to 
regulate one's action by auxiliary means (i.e., the use of nonsense 
words) was not fully developed before adolescence where "all exist-
ing functions are incorporated into a new structure ... , become parts 
of a new complex whole." (Vygotsky, 1934/1986, p. 108). 
What is the essentially new information about developmental 
changes in children's concept formation that we can derive from 
Vygotsky's approach? According to Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett, the 
core message is that "the new complex whole assembled during ado-
lescence forms the basis of all higher mental functions; activity be-
comes sign-mediated as cultural mental functions supersede natural 
mental functions in the determination of behavior." In my view, how-
ever, we do not learn much about "natural mental functions" in 
Vygotsky's experiment, mainly because the method of double Stimu-
lation forces children to adopt rules provided by the experimenter. It 
is difficult to see how this methodological approach fits with the 
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basic theoretical assurnption of interdependence between developing 
individuals and their environments, a clairn inherent in both Lewin's 
and Vygotsky ' s theories. 
As ernphasized by Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett, Vygotsky's approach 
was strongly influenced by Piaget's "clinical rnethod," a procedure 
highly regarded even in conternporary textbooks of developrnental 
psychology. This rnethod, which involves first confronting children 
with a problern solving task, then urging thern to corne up with a solu-
tion (judgrnent), and finally asking thern to justify their judgrnent, has 
been assurned to be an elegant procedure to explore the way children 
make use of their existing "cognitive structures." However, critics 
like Aebli are not convinced that the clinical rnethod teils us rnuch 
about children's problern solving in everyday situations. At about the 
time when Piaget's theory was introduced into Arnerican psychology, 
Aebli (1963) published bis critical analysis of the Piagetian proce-
dure. In his view, the clinical rnethod Ieads to instable, ad hoc pro-
ductions that are of no relevance for children's decision rnaking in 
everyday problern solving situations. In subsequent experiments con-
ducted by Aebli and his coworkers (cf. Aebli, 1984; Riesen, 1988), it 
indeed could be shown that children' s performance in Piagetian con-
servation tasks does not predict their behavior in sirnilar everyday 
problern solving situations. For example, when confronted with the 
problern that there was not enough tea available in a glass that should 
be given to a sick child, all of the children who did not master 
Piaget's conservation task (i.e., who believed that transferring liquid 
from a broad, low glass into a thin, high glass will produce rnore liq-
uid) recornmended adding new tea in order to help the sick child; 
none of the children spontaneously suggested that the experimenter 
should pour the tea from the glass into a (thinner and higher) tea bot-
tle in order to produce rnore tea for the sick child. Of coursc, most of 
these "nonconservers" found the experimenter's idea of pouring the 
tea from the glass into the tea bott1e helpful in order to improve the 
sick child's situation. However, when asked to decide between the 
options of either transferring the tea from the glass to the bottle or to 
add a small arnount of tea to the liquid already in the bottle, alrnost 
all of the children preferred the latter possibility. 
If Aebli is right-and there is reason to agree with bis position-
using the clinical method does not give us rnuch insight into the rela-
tionship between the child and its environment. It is difficult to 
imagine that Piaget, Lewin, or Vygotsky were able to create experi-
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mental test situations that suitably mirrored the "constructive oppor-
tunities" afforded by children's everyday-life, natural environments. 
This is not to say that these great researchers were unable to stimulate 
our thinking about human development. Undoubtedly, the opposite is 
the case. What I doubt is that their experimental methodology gets us 
to the ambitious goals Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett have in mind. 
Thus I do not see any new feature in this type of intraindividual 
analysis that overcomes the basic shortcomings of traditional experi-
mental research. Like most contemporary experimental paradigms, 
the "genetic method" does not attend to the child's perspective re-
garding the task. Rather, the child is viewed as a passive respondent 
faced with tasks of relevance to the experimenter (cf. Sigel, 1986). In 
order to better understand the outcomes of experimental tests, it 
seems important to know more about children's constructions of the 
situation and their interpretation of this experience. 
Do We Really Need Different Agendas for Studying 
"Descriptive" Processes and "Explanatory'' Mechanisms? 
As the reader may have inferred from the previous section, I am not 
convinced that searching for "general laws of development" or gen-
eral "explanatory mechanisms" will benefit much from the "genetic 
method" described above. Actually, I do not believe that searching 
for rather global developmental mechanisms constitutes a prornising 
research strategy for the future. The research findings presented in re-
cent books and joumal articles on issues of cognitive development 
suggest that there is much more variety, domain-specificity, and com-
plexity in cognitive development than indicated by the six theories 
presented in Sternberg's book. As noted by Flavell (1984), there is 
more variety in what gets developed and also more variety in how de-
velopmental changes get accomplished. Accordingly, we may be 
obliged to devise specific theories for specific transitions. 
How do we get to such theories? In my view, approaches such as 
the hierarchical linear modeling procedure devised by Bryk and 
Raudenbush (1987), based on the analysis of individual growth curve 
parameters does have the potential to promote our understanding of 
interindividual differences in intraindividual developmental changes 
for a wide range of domains. Another promising methodological ap-
proach-although probably not similarly suited for complex statistical 
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analysis-is what Siegier and Jenkins (1989) have labeled the 
"microgenetic method." The two key properties of microgenetic 
methods are that (1) the same subjects are observed over an extended 
period of time, and (2) their learning is subjected to intensive trial-
by-trial analysis, with a goal of inferring the underlying processes 
that gave rise to both qualitative and quantitative aspects of leaming 
(cf. Siegier & Jenkins, 1989, p. 9). One of the major advantages of 
this approach over traditionallongitudinal methods is that the time in-
tervals between measurement points are very small, thus allowing for 
the assessment of transitional periods (e.g., the identification of the 
exact point at which a new behavior was first shown). Siegier and 
Jenkins demonstrated the utility of this approach for studying strategy 
construction in young cbildren, showing that careful observation and 
description of the children's problern solving activities over many tri-
als led to the identification of a set of transitional processes preceding 
the discovery of a counting strategy. 
In my view, tbis approach combines intra- and interindividual anal-
ysis in that it is based on a collection of single-case studies, enabling 
the researcher to compare individual developmental paths in order to 
detect commonalities that can be conceived of as more general transi-
tion rules. Although the microgenetic method entails certain disad-
vantages because it is expensive and based on small sample sizes, it 
not only provides us with a detailed picture of the idiosyncracies of 
individual performance, but may also allow low-level inferences 
about "developmental mechanisms" better suited for "explaining" be-
havioral changes than the global conceptualizations predominant in 
current developmental theories. 
As I have emphasized before, I was very impressed by the way 
Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett handled the very complicated issue of 
processes and mechanisms of cognitive development. Their chapter 
helped in stimulating my thinking about this issue in several ways. It 
is mainly due to space restrictions that I bave focused on those points 
where webavedifferent opinions. Obviously, the main difference be-
tween our positions isthat Lightfoot and Folds-Bennett ask for differ-
ent researcb agendas in order to explore descriptive processes versus 
explanatory mechanisms, whereas I believe that careful and sophisti-
cated experimental (longitudinal) research can help in reaching both 
goals. Thus my conviction is that we do not need different methodol-
ogies but more fine-grained, domain-specific analyses than before in 
order to move from descriptions of development to the detection of 
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transitional mecbanisms. As several longitudinal sturlies on cognitive 
development are currently conducted, we soon may be in a position to 
evaluate this claim. 
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